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Abstract
While the beneficial effects of social trust on economic performance have been largely rec-
ognized, we analyze whether these effects can be generalized for economies at different stages
of economic development. Contrary to previous studies on this issue based on average effects
(mostly considering ordinary least squares estimations), we follow a quantile regression ap-
proach that enables us to capture heterogeneous effects of trust for different development levels.
By considering data for 80 countries, and using trust indicators from five different waves of the
World Values Survey (WVS), our results by quantile indicate that trust is not relevant for the
poorest economies, showing the existence of a social poverty trap. In addition, results suggest
that the impact of trust on income decreases as an economy becomes richer. This would suggest
not only that trust benefits cannot be generalized for all countries, as some previous studies
have proposed, but also that the extent of its implications are heavily dependent on the level of
development.
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1. Introduction
One of the most successful theories explaining the determinants of economic growth in
relatively recent times is that considering the influence of social capital. In this field of
research, scholars have attempted to ascertain whether the level of social capital in a given
country or region is a key driver for economic development, among other related questions.
Many studies were triggered by the findings of Putnam (1993), whose pioneering study
concluded that social capital was a relevant determinant of the economic disparities across
Italian regions. Following in Putnam’s footsteps, contributions such as Knack and Keefer
(1997), Zak and Knack (2001) or Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), and more recently,
Dearmon and Grier (2009), Doh and McNeely (2011) or Horvath (2012), among others, have
highlighted positive effects flowing from social capital to economic development, using
different samples of countries or regions, and different time periods.
These widely accepted effects are not free from controversy, however, because the social
capital definitions used differ from one study to another. Social capital is a multifaceted
concept (Bjørnskov, 2006) and includes trust, networks and associationism, as well as social
norms. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate proxy for social capital becomes essential.
In this study, we select the level of trust, since it is the most widely used indicator in this
context. In addition, the trust indicator has been proved to be a reliable measure of honesty,
generalized trust and trustworthiness, as shown in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Uslaner
(2002). Finally, although we could have included several social capital indicators, an in-
depth study should focus on just one aspect of social capital (Yamamura, 2012).
Although academic progress in the field of research of trust and economic develop-
ment is already substantial, more evidence is needed on some particular fronts. One of
these fronts on which no consensus has yet been reached relates to determining whether
trust effects are stronger in poor in rich countries. This argument has become one of the
most challenging issues in trust studies. This is highlighted by Knack and Keefer (1997),
who included in their regression the interaction term trust×initial income, finding a neg-
ative coefficient, which implies that the effects might be stronger for poorer economies.
Other authors have followed different strategies. For instance, Dearmon and Grier (2009),
split their sample into two sub-samples based on the 25 (poorest) and 75 (richest) per-
centiles, carrying out Chow tests which showed no differential impacts. Ahlerup et al.
(2009), controlling for the institutional environment, conclude that trust is more essential
for the poorest economies, since these are characterized by weaker institutions and then
1
interpersonal trust plays a major role. However, Putnam (1993, p.178), held the opposite
opinion and argued—referring to social capital in a broader sense—that “the importance
of social capital increases as development proceeds. This may help explain why the gap
between the civic North and the uncivic South of Italy has widened over the last century”.
Whatever the case, this discussion evidences scholars’ interest in highlighting non-linearities
on the impact of trust.
Previous evidence on this issue is, however, based on average effects, mainly using or-
dinary least squares (OLS). Yet that approach, which generalizes the effect of trust on
economic performance, suffers some limitations. On the one hand, in the large samples of
countries on which studies are based, outlying observations are common. That may yield
estimated coefficients heavily affected by these outliers, and therefore biased. Beugelsdijk
et al. (2004) reported evidence suggesting that the robustness of the positive impact of
trust is heavily affected by sample selection.1 On the other hand, even when outliers are
identified and controlled for, trust may be affecting economic development with varying
intensity depending on the country’s stage of development. Another likely scenario is that
trust is relevant for some countries within a certain range of economic development, while
for others its effects are not important at all.
The present contribution attempts to provide a response to these issues by using quan-
tile regression, a methodology initially developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). This
technique, increasingly popular in the field of economic growth, as evidenced in recent
studies by Mello and Perrelli (2003), Barreto and Hughes (2004) or Crespo-Cuaresma et al.
(2011) (among others), enables us to quantify the different magnitudes of the effect of
the covariates on the entire distribution of the variable of interest, in our case, the level
of income. Different results by quantile would be suggesting heterogeneous effects of trust
for different degrees of economic development, an unresolved question as argued in the
preceding paragraphs. Additionally, as we will see later in the paper, quantile regression
has other powerful advantages that are especially useful in this particular context. These
include its efficiency when dealing with non-normal dependent variables, and when the
analyst faces the difficulty of taking into account the whole set of variables that may be
affecting economic performance.
1The authors evaluate the robustness of Knack and Keefer’s (1997) and Zak and Knack’s (2001) results.
They conclude that the inclusion of additional countries in the sample in Zak and Knack (2001), in particular
countries with low-trust levels, substantially increases the robustness of the findings—i.e. trust positively
impacts economic growth.
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In addition, previous studies on this issue are based on data provided by a single wave
of the World Values Survey (WVS)2, with a few exceptions such as Ahlerup et al. (2009)
and Dearmon and Grier (2009, 2011), who considered several waves. Our study is based
on the latter contribution, but substantially enlarges their sample by also considering data
from the most recent WVS wave (2005-2007). Therefore, the contribution of the paper to
the literature is twofold. First, it is innovative in both the sample considered—it is one of
the largest in this context; and in the time span studied—it is to our knowledge one of the
few considering the most recent wave from the WVS. Second, we use quantile regression
to study the likely existence of heterogeneous effects between rich and poor countries. This
twofold analysis might shed additional light on the true behavioral pattern showed by
trust.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the causal links from trust to income
are detailed. Section 3 is devoted to some insights on the quantile regression approach
used in the paper. In Section 4 we present both the models to be estimated and the data,
along with some descriptive statistics. Section 5 analyzes the results and, finally, Section 6
provides some concluding remarks.
2. The links between trust and economic development
A large number of studies have evaluated the influence of trust on economic performance,
as well as the transmission mechanisms of its influence, especially since the late nineties.
The first insights, however, were introduced some years previously in sociological studies
such as those by Arrow (1972) and Sen (1977), who held that the existence of trust in society
plays an important role in the operation of the systems and that societies need some norms
and rules of conduct to be viable. The mechanisms trough which trust may affect economic
development are multilateral—i.e. they follow multiple paths. In practical terms, however,
this seriously complicates the task of isolating the different channels through which trust
may affect economic development.
The central point of the trust theory is the reduction of the transaction costs into eco-
nomic operations. Putnam (1993) and Whiteley (2000) put forth that trust facilitates co-
ordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, as well as solving problems of collective
action and reducing the incentives for opportunism and egoism. In the same line, Knack
and Keefer (1997) argued that trust reduces the cost of monitoring possible free riding
2See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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behavior. Whiteley (2000) suggested that low-trust societies are characterized by strong
regulations and bureaucratic procurements that impose costs and reduce efficiency. A suf-
ficiently high stock of trust, therefore, might facilitate and lubricate complex transactions
and improve their efficiency (Putnam, 1993), saving operational costs and, ultimately, en-
hancing economic output (Knack and Keefer, 1997). As Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005)
noted, this might occur as a result of an increase in information flows, groups, flexibility
and coordinated actions. A similar argument is put forward by Dearmon and Grier (2009),
who concluded that trust mitigates information asymmetries between negotiating parties,
and it may facilitate contracts and agreements.
Other authors, such as Ahlerup et al. (2009), related the role of trust to that of the
institutions. They concluded that the potential effects of trust emerge in societies with weak
institutions. Since the institutional framework in these societies cannot guarantee security
in economic transactions, then trust plays an essential role. In countries with stronger
and more reliable institutional frameworks, trust is not so relevant. Therefore, trust and
institutions may be treated as substitutes. For Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), however,
trust is indispensable for economic development even in the presence of well-functioning
institutions since, they argue, despite having the appropriate institutional setting, some
transactions would be almost impossible in the absence of trust. Recently, Bjørnskov and
Méon (2013) suggested that trust positively affects institutional quality, and that translates
into positive effects on income.
A variety of other activities, which at the same time positively impacts economic per-
formance, might be influenced by trust—i.e. they would be indirect transmission channels.
One of these activities is investment, as put forward by Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and
Knack (2001), Dearmon and Grier (2011) or Bjørnskov (2012), to name some of the most
relevant contributions. Human capital is also one of these activities. Bjørnskov(2009; 2012)
as well as Dearmon and Grier (2011) concluded that trust influences schooling and that in
high-trust economies human capital might be more easily transmitted. Another activity
positively influenced by trust is technological innovation. Akçomak and Ter Weel (2009)
concluded that trust affects growth by fostering innovation for a sample of 102 European
regions, while Miguélez et al. (2011) found analogous results in the context of the Spanish
regions. Trust might also foster participation in the credit market and financial develop-
ment, as held by Guiso et al. (2004). For a sample of Italian regions these authors found that
in areas where trust is high, households invest more in stock, use more checks, have higher
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access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. Guiso et al. (2009) found
that trust is also essential for trade, especially when the products are complex. Finally,
Knack (2002) and Bjørnskov (2012) documented a positive influence from trust to better
governance.
Trust effects, both in the way they reduce transaction costs and through impacts on
the above-mentioned activities, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative (Putnam, 1993),
involving economies in a difficult-to-reverse virtuous circle of high—or low—trust stock.
Despite the controversy generated on the true causality direction of these effects—i.e. likely
endogeneity of trust, causality running from economic development to trust is not plau-
sible. This has been corroborated by Uslaner (2008), Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011), who point out the heritability of trust across generations. More
recently, Bjørnskov and Méon (2013) concluded that the stability of trust since the World
War II corroborates its exogeneity, in the sense that the changing income levels over time
are difficult to reconcile with the stability of trust.
Whereas the consensus on the causality direction from trust to development is rela-
tively wide, the likely existence of heterogeneous effects of trust depending on the level of
development is not so well clarified. Following Knack and Keefer (1997) and Ahlerup et al.
(2009),3 trust might be a substitute of the legal framework in the poorest economies. How-
ever, for other authors such as North (1990), trust would be more relevant for the richer
countries, where the nature of the transactions becomes more complex and the returns
from free-riding behaviors increase as well. Regardless of the particular case, the use of
quantile regression might provide some evidence on this issue.
3. A brief outline of quantile regression methods
Quantile regression (QR) was initially developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), although
applications in the economic growth literature are relatively recent, mainly appearing in the
last ten years. The numerous advantages provided by this technique have led to an increase
in the number of contributions, including Mello and Perrelli (2003), Barreto and Hughes
(2004), Osborne (2006) and Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011), among others, as commented
on in the introduction. In the specific context of trust, applications are yet to come, and
previous results have generally been reached by using the standard Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimations, which contribute to explain average effects on the variable of interest.
3See also Boix and Posner (1998).
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Although OLS provide a useful framework to start from, their use in this particular con-
text can be troublesome for several reasons. For instance, the economic growth literature
uses samples made up of very heterogeneous countries or regions, with large disparities in
terms of income levels. The same practice is followed in the specific case of measuring trust
effects on development, where the generalization of trust impacts based on average effects
is common practice.4 In such a situation, with heavy-tailed distributions of the dependent
variable, and thus favoring the existence of outliers, mean effects provided by OLS may be
actually driven by these extreme observations. Furthermore, focusing only on the central
tendency of the variable of interest (trust in our case) may be obscuring important informa-
tion about its effects on other points of the distribution of the dependent variable (Maloney
et al., 2004). In this sense, some authors such as Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer (1997), or
Dearmon and Grier (2009), to name a few, have previously been interested in disentangling
such an important matter, but to date there is no widespread consensus.
In an attempt to provide an accurate response to the previous unresolved issues, we use
quantile regression, which provides results not only on the average effect. Rather, it enables
us to draw conclusions as to how the covariates impact on the entire distribution of the
response variable. To this end, different quantiles (τ) are selected (for instance, selecting
quantile τ = 0.5 would refer to median regression, analogously to OLS when referring to
average regression) and, therefore, different slopes are estimated for the different quantiles,
highlighting the existence of heterogeneous effects and non-linearities.
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978), each β parameter is estimated by minimizing the
absolute sum of the residuals—not the squared sum as in OLS. It is expressed as follows:
minQ(βq) =
N
∑
i:yi>x′iβ
τ|yi − x′iβτ |+
N
∑
i:yi<x′iβ
(1− τ)|yi − x′iβτ | (1)
where τ, which lies within the [0, 1] interval, represents a specific quantile.
The above function is not differentiable and therefore it cannot be optimized with the
classical gradient methods. A linear programming problem is solved instead.5 Each esti-
4There are a few exceptions, like Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), who used a homogeneous sample
of European regions. However, their choice was not based on avoiding large disparities in growth rates,
but rather on the attempt to reduce to the minimum differences on how social capital is understood in the
different regions. Nevertheless, Freitag and Bauer (2013) recently conclude that the WVS question about
trusting others is similarly understood in culturally different countries, which would imply that the meaning
of trust is relatively universal.
5Further theoretical explanations on quantile regression fall outside the scope of this paper. Koenker (2005),
provides an excellent discussion on the advanced statistical details concerning this technique.
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mated βˆτ is asymptotically distributed as N → (0,Ωτ), where Ωτ is the variance conva-
riance matrix of βˆτ for a given τ. The algorithm used to compute the fit is that proposed
by Barrodale and Roberts (1974), explained in detail in Koenker and d’Orey (1987). Fol-
lowing Koenker (1994), we compute confidence bands by implementing the rank method,
suitable for samples with fewer that 1,000 observations, which is precisely our case. How-
ever, Koenker and Hallock (2001, p.15) suggested that “the discrepancies among competing
methods are slight, and inference for quantile regression is more robust than for most other
forms of inference commonly encountered in econometrics.”
Among the advantages of quantile regression is its semi-parametric nature, in the sense
that assumptions about the distribution of regression errors are avoided—i.e. it is more
robust under heteroscedasticity (Cameron and Trivedi 2009, p.211). Another advantage,
underlined by Coad and Rao (2008), is the robustness of the quantile estimator under non-
normal distributions of the response variable, whilst the OLS estimator loses efficiency
in the same circumstances. As we note on in the next section, the distribution of the
dependent variable employed in the present study depart from the Gaussian distribution
(the reader might take a preliminary look at Figure 1). Therefore, the use of the quantile
estimator may give a more accurate result.
Additionally, Durlauf (2002) claimed that studies measuring trust effects are based on
models where the number of control variables included, together with trust, is insufficient,
leading to omitted variable biases.6 As a result, it may cause an imprecise predictive
relationship between the mean of the dependent variable distribution and the measured
covariates. In such a case, quantile regression may generate useful predictive relationships
with other parts of the response variable distribution (Cade and Noon, 2003).
Following the latter authors, quantile regression is especially useful when there is more
than one single factor affecting the response variable, and not all factors are measured,
and also when the factors show heterogeneous effects. Therefore, in our context, quantile
regression might provide useful insights in determining whether the effect of trust on
development is linked to the degree of development of the country or, on the contrary,
differences turn out not to be remarkable.
6As we explain in Section 4, the trust literature generally uses a variant of the neoclassical growth model,
and control variables differ from one paper to another. Nevertheless, this is common practice in the entire
economic growth literature and, although it is true that recent contributions are evaluating the effects on
growth of larger sets of covariates, no consensus as to which model offers the best fit has yet been reached.
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4. Model, data and descriptive statistics
4.1. Model
In the particular context of economic growth, there is a relatively large number of models
that differ according to the covariates they include. Brock and Durlauf (2001) referred to
this fact as theory-openendedness in the sense that, whereas a lot of theories and models may
be explaining economic growth, no one specific theory is more powerful than the others
(Henderson et al., 2011). Bearing in mind the above arguments, we adopt a version of
the widely-accepted neoclassical growth model developed by Mankiw et al. (1992), but
expanded by including trust. This strategy will ease comparison with previous findings in
the literature on trust and growth, which has traditionally relied on the neoclassical growth
model.
However, while in the great majority of studies the dependent variable of the model is
growth rates, in our case, since our aim is to evaluate the likely existence of differential im-
pacts of trust depending on the level of development of the country, the response variable
will be income levels. Neoclassical models in levels are relatively scarcer, but not com-
pletely unheard of. For instance, Mankiw et al. (1992) themselves, proposed a version of
their model in levels. Osborne (2006) conducted his study by using both the growth rates
and income levels versions of the neoclassical model. He suggested that while growth
rates measure differences between slow- and fast-growing countries, income levels mea-
sure differences between poor and rich countries. Therefore, the version in levels of the
model is a more appropriate strategy to deal with our research question. In the particular
context of trust and development and closer to our research, Dearmon and Grier (2009)
and Bjørnskov and Méon (2013) also based their analysis on models in levels. Therefore,
following the above contributions, the dependent variable of the model to be estimated is
GDPPC—i.e the level of income per capita (in logs).
In order to capture the effects of trust and studying its robustness across different model
specifications, we construct four models where TRUST—i.e. the trust indicator,7 is always
considered as a fixed regressor and other control variables commonly considered by the
growth literature are included sequentially. In particular, Model 1 only includes as re-
gressors an intercept and TRUST. Model 2 incorporates the Solow variables, 8 including
7Detailed information on how this variable is constructed is given in Section 4.2.
8See Solow (1957) and Henderson et al. (2011) for an example of the use of this label for referring to the
baseline variables of the neoclassical growth model. Note that when the model is expressed in levels the
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GWORK, corresponding to the growth of the working population plus a fixed coefficient
equal to 0.059; IGDP, which is the rate of investment as a percentage of GDP; and HK,
measuring the share of working population with secondary education. Additional controls
are added in Model 3. These include OPENNESS, which is the degree of trade openness
(share of GDP) of the country; POLITY, which is a synthetic indicator of the democratic
degree of political institutions; ETHNIC, which captures the degree of ethnic fractional-
ization; and AFRICA, a binary variable equal to 1 for African countries and 0 otherwise.
Finally, Model 4, the most comprehensive model, adds temporal controls, tw, to Model 3.
Following the recommendation of Dearmon and Grier (2009), fixed effects by country are
not included because, as in their case, only one observation is available for some of the
countries—our database is actually constructed by pooling all the data, as it will be shown
in Section 4.2. Data are aggregated in the periods for which information on TRUST is avail-
able. Therefore, the full model (corresponding to Model 4) to be estimated corresponds to
the following expression:
GDPPCw = β0 + β1TRUSTw + β2GWORKw + β3 IGDPw + β4HKw + β5OPENNESSw
+ β6POLITYw + β7ETHNICw + β8AFRICA+ β9tw + εw (2)
where the subindex w represents the time period.
4.2. Data and descriptive statistics
Data on trust are available in the World Values Survey (WVS). We take data from five
different waves corresponding to the periods 1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2004
and 2005–2007. Trust is measured from responses to the following question: “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing
with people?”. Two possible answers are provided, namely: (i) “most people can be trusted”;
and (ii) “can’t be too careful”. An index of trust is then constructed from the percentage
of respondents who answered “most people can be trusted”. The rest of the control variables
come from different databases: the PennWorld Tables (PWT 6.3),10 the Barro-Lee education
variable controlling for the initial level of income is omitted (see the version in levels of the model in Mankiw
et al. (1992) and Osborne (2006)).
9Following Mankiw et al. (1992), this fixed coefficient represents technological advance and depreciation.
10See http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
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database (BL),11 the World Development Indicators (WDI),12 the Polity IV database,13 and
the Quality of Government database.14 A full description of the variables and their sources
is available in Table 2.
When studying economic growth over long periods, as in our case, data are generally
aggregated in subperiods of four or five years, as suggested by Islam (1995). Nevertheless,
whereas the PTW, the WDI, the Polity IV and the Quality of Government databases all
provide yearly data and BL every five years, which would allow us to follow that strategy,
WVS only provides data for the periods detailed above. Therefore, we aggregate the data
for these five subperiods, following Dearmon and Grier (2009), although their study does
not include the latest WVS wave.
One drawback with the WVS data concerns the different number of countries for which
data are available in each wave. For example, the first wave (1981–1984) offers only data for
only 19 countries, whereas the most recent wave (2005–2007) provides information for 49
countries. For this reason some countries have five observations, whilst for others only one
is available. We take the maximum number of observations, after merging the WVS data
with the rest of the databases. In some cases, although data on trust are available, data for
the rest of covariates are not. This merger yields 80 countries and 208 pooled observations
(see Table 1). Hence, we expand Dearmon and Grier’s (2009) sample with 89 additional ob-
servations. Other samples in this context are considerably smaller; for instance, Knack and
Keefer (1997) (29 countries), Whiteley (2000) (34 countries) or Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik
(2005) (54 regions). To our knowledge, our sample is the largest to date in the literature
analyzing the effects of trust on economic development.
Some descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3, which shows important disparities.
Focusing on our variable of interest—i.e. TRUST—the comparison between its maximum
value, 74%, and its minimum, 2.8%, shows how significant the differences really are. How-
ever, such notable disparities are not exclusively confined to TRUST; the other variables
under study also present remarkable differences, as can be seen from Table 3.
Figure 1 shows the density estimated via kernel smoothing of the dependent variable,
GDPPC (in logs). As briefly introduced in Section 3, the density deviates from the Gaus-
sian distribution. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Mello and Perrelli (2003) argued that
11See http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm.
12See http://www.worldbank.org/.
13See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm/.
14See Teorell et al. (2011).
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distributions of the average GDP per capita are usually strongly skewed. In our case, as
shown in Figure 1, the distribution presents long tails, deviating from normality.15 There-
fore, the use of quantile regression might be appropriate in this context, since we estimate
the effects of trust for a sample with a remarkable level of heterogeneity, where data from
countries such as the United States, Germany, Japan or El Salvador and Zimbabwe, are
pooled.
5. Results
5.1. OLS regressions
In order to evaluate the relationship between trust (TRUST) and income per capita
(GDPPC) we start by performing OLS estimations for the different models specified in
Section 4. Table 4 provides the results for all four models. The results for Model 1, where
only an intercept and TRUST are considered as regressors, suggest a positive and highly
significant effect for TRUST. The magnitude of this effect, however, decreases when other
variables are included in the more comprehensive models (Models 2, 3 and 4). This is an
expected result, in the sense that in the first model the TRUST coefficient might be upward
biased, since the model is disregarding other determinants of the income level. Never-
theless, the estimated coefficient never loses its significance, even after controlling for the
Solow variables (Model 2) and the remaining variables considered in Models 3 and 4, the
last including time effects.
Therefore, trust has a significant influence on income per capita and these results might
be supporting previous findings in the literature such as those by Knack and Keefer (1997),
Zak and Knack (2001) and Horvath (2012). Yet comparisons should be made with caution,
since as commented on in Section 4.1, most studies in this context use growth rates as a
measure of economic performance, and not income levels, as we do. For a direct compar-
ison with models in levels we focus on Dearmon and Grier (2009), who found analogous
results for a sample of 51 countries, and recently Bjørnskov and Méon (2013), whose results
are also in consonance with those found in this study. Therefore, our results add further
evidence on this issue. Using a larger sample of countries and the most recent available
data for trust, results hold.
15Normality was formally tested by using Shapiro and Wilk’s (1965) and Doornik and Hansen’s (2008) tests,
and in both cases the normality assumption was strongly rejected. Results from these tests are available from
the authors upon request.
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The other variables included in the different specifications—i.e. Models 2, 3 and 4—
show in most cases the expected signs, but these are not always significant. While the
investment variable (IGDP) is positive and significant for all three models where it is in-
cluded (Models 2, 3 an 4), the growth of working population (GWORK) and the variable
controlling for education (HK) are significant in Model 2 but lose significance when ad-
ditional controls are included. The influence of government institutions (POLITY) seems
to be relevant for income levels, while the degree of openness (OPENNESS), ethnic frac-
tionalization (ETHNIC), and perhaps surprisingly, the dummy variable (AFRICA) are
non-significant.
5.2. Quantile regressions
Although OLS regressions provide useful insights, as commented on throughout the study,
they focus on the average effect. Therefore, this strategy sheds no light on the effects in other
particular parts of the response variable. Effects of trust may vary, which is actually the
case, across quantiles, implying differing behaviors depending on the country’s level of
income. Figure 2 plots different fits for Model 1 (where TRUST is included as a single
regressor together with an intercept). The plot is very illustrative, since it displays the
results for OLS estimation, the median (“median regression”), as well as some percentiles
(additional details are available in the footnote of the figure). Although we cannot draw
definitive conclusions from this analysis (control variables are not included, and inference
could be seriously affected by omitted variable biases), its usage is, at first sight, interesting.
It clearly shows different slopes for TRUST, depending on the percentile. Such a finding
implies that generalization of the OLS results should be, at the very least, questioned.
Therefore, in this section we perform quantile regressions for the four models. Results
for the main percentiles for the different models are available in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8, while
Table 9 provides ANOVA tests for the equality of the slopes of TRUST for the different
quantile estimates. More detailed and accurate results are displayed in Figure 3, where
the estimates for the 100 percentiles are graphically displayed (percentile regression). The
solid red line, constant across quantiles, corresponds to the OLS estimation. The dashed red
lines are 90% confidence intervals. The dotted black line reflects the results by quantile—
i.e. different percentiles—and the shaded area, the associated 90% confidence intervals.
Another solid black line set at zero helps us to see at a glance when a variable is significant
or not—depending on whether the zero value of the OY axis overlaps or not with the
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confidence bands. Note that, supporting the results found in Section 5.1, the bands for
OLS do not overlap the zero in any of the models, and therefore TRUST is significant on
average.
When the quantile estimation is performed, a common pattern for TRUST is observed
for all four models. Note that the 90% confidence bands overlap the zero line for the poorest
countries (approximately those in the range of percentiles 0–15, depending on the model).
Such a pattern suggests that TRUST is non-significant for these countries. However, when
a country reaches a certain level of development, the impact of TRUST on income becomes
highly significant (from percentile 15 approximately, slightly variant across models) and
furthermore, its contribution to income is maximum. After that, the coefficient begins to
decrease progressively until the highest quantiles, where there is a rebound (for Models 2,
3 and 4), although the confidence bands indicate that such a rebound is no longer signifi-
cant after the 95 percentile—i.e. the very richest countries. Note that the pattern remains
essentially unaltered in the different model specifications, which might suggest that, even
when controlling for multiple income determinants, results for TRUST are relatively ro-
bust. ANOVA tests provided in Table 9 corroborate that the magnitude of the coefficients
actually differs across quantiles.
These are interesting results considering previous arguments in the trust literature.
Knack and Keefer (1997) suggested that trust effects should be stronger for poorer coun-
tries. They held that those countries are characterized by both weak institutions and poor
legal frameworks, and trust may become an informal framework to guarantee transactions.
Shortly after, Zak and Knack (2001) introduced a new concept, the low-trust poverty trap.
They argued that poor countries with a lower stock of trust, despite the presumption of
the neoclassical growth model of higher returns to capital and potential faster growth,16
may not make the most of their backward situation. However, poor countries where trust
is sufficiently high would take advantage of that backwardness and, therefore, trust would
become the “lubricant” for development. According to our results, this argument does not
hold, since for the poorest countries TRUST is non-significant, and therefore the level of
trust that they actually have is not relevant.
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) dug more deeply in this line of research and evaluated
the causes of what they called the social trap. They suggested that the poorest countries are
16This is a central point in the convergence literature. The production factors show diminishing returns, and
therefore the poorer economies generally grow faster than the richer ones. See Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992)
for an excellent discussion.
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normally characterized by high levels of income inequality and dysfunctional institutions,
and that has a pernicious effect on trust. If institutions are expected to establish policies in
order to mitigate inequality, but trust is low, then these policies cannot be properly estab-
lished. If policies are not appropriately applied, then this also negatively affects trust and
therefore, “poor and inegalitarian countries find themselves trapped in a situation of con-
tinuing inequality, mistrust and dysfunctional institutions” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005,
p.71). Additional support is given by Bjørnskov (2007) and Fairbrother and Martin (2013),
who find that income inequality is one of the factors destroying social trust. Partially linked
to these assertions, Ahlerup et al. (2009) argued that the positive effect of trust dilutes when
formal institutions become stronger and more reliable for guaranteeing economic transac-
tions. Therefore, trust would be less relevant for richer countries, which are precisely those
benefiting from stronger institutional frameworks. In this respect, the recent contribution
by Bjørnskov and Méon (2013) concluded that trust is linked to institutional development,
and therefore trust effects in rich countries might be channeled through better formal in-
stitutions.
The pattern shown by TRUST in our results by quantile might support the above ar-
guments. On the one hand, they evidence the existence of the social trap, since trust is
non-significant for the poorest countries. In these countries, an increase in the level of trust
will not yield any positive effect on income. On the other hand, they lend support to the
argument that for the relatively richer countries, which are those with better institutions,
trust is less relevant for income per capita. Therefore, once a country succeeds in escaping
from the social trap, income might enjoy the maximum contribution from trust, since the
institutions still cannot guarantee transactions. During the development process, institu-
tions tend to reinforce, transactions become securer and trust loses importance, since its
positive effects are supplied by the formal institutional framework.
Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 also report the results for the rest of variables included as controls.
The growth of population (GWORK) is significant for the relatively poor countries in Model
2, while the investment variable (IGDP) remains highly significant, regardless of the model.
Human capital (HK), seems to be relevant only for the relatively richer countries in Model 2,
and exclusively for the richest in Model 3. The degree of trade openness (OPENNESS) and
the degree of ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC), show the expected positive and negative
sign respectively, but are no longer significant. The variable capturing government quality
(POLITY) is positive and highly significant across quantiles and specifications and, finally,
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the dummy variable for African countries (AFRICA) is non-significant.
6. Concluding remarks
Most of the studies evaluating the role of trust on economic development concluded that
trust influences economic development, following both direct and indirect channels. Yet in
the great majority of cases scholars have generalized the outcomes of trust, neglecting that
trust might affect income with different intensity depending on the level of development
of the country, and therefore showing heterogeneous effects and non-linearities.
This study contributes to the literature in two different aspects. Firstly, it expands
Dearmon and Grier’s (2009) sample, one of the widest in this particular context, with
89 additional observations and also considering the most recent data on trust from the
WVS (2005-2007). And secondly, the analysis is performed using both OLS and quantile
regression. Whereas the first approach corroborates previous findings in the literature—
i.e. trust is one of the drivers of economic development—, the second has allowed us to
evaluate with some precision non-linear impacts of trust across the conditional quantiles
of income, casting considerable doubts on the generalization of trust effects.
In particular, the quantile regression estimations indicate that trust might not be rele-
vant for the poorest countries, showing also a decreasing pattern, forecasting diminishing
returns for trust as an economy becomes richer. These results are particularly robust to
different model specifications, where additional controls are included sequentially. This
intriguing result might point suggest some sort of social trap could exist for the poorest
economies, corroborating previous arguments by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), Bjørnskov
(2007), Ahlerup et al. (2009) and Fairbrother and Martin (2013), focused on the role played
by the institutional framework as well as income inequality.
Our findings might also help providing some policy recommendations. The results
suggest that, on average, trust affects income and, therefore, policies promoting social trust
would be welcome. However, this is not an easy task, since the heritable character of trust
implies that the capacity of the governments for boosting it is limited. In addition, our
results by quantile suggest that efforts to increase trust levels in the poorest economies
might not be the best strategy but rather to concentrate the efforts on those aspects that
might underlie the social trap.
The results have some limitations as well. While income inequality might be one poten-
tial candidate for explaining these traps, future research should try to provide additional
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evidence on this respect. In addition, although the recent contribution by Freitag and Bauer
(2013) concluded that the concept of trust is equally understood across cultures, the debate
on that point remains open, as some contributions hold opposite views. Specifically, Holm
and Danielson (2005) argues that trust scores, especially in African countries, might not be
capturing the relevant concept and, therefore, results should be taken carefully.
In summary, this study has provided evidence for achieving an understanding of the
effects of trust on income for different levels of development and, while it has shed light
on the issue, additional evidence on related fronts would be welcome. Among them, some
of the most intriguing questions would be, first, reaching a fuller understanding of what
might exactly underlie the social trap and, second, which could actually be the mecha-
nisms through which governments and international organizations might influence these
scenarios.
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Table 1: Sample description
Country
World Values Survey waves
Wave 1 (1981-1984) Wave 2 (1989-1993) Wave 3 (1994-1998) Wave 4 (1999-2004) Wave 5 (2005-2007)
Albania* x x
Algeria x
Argentina x x x x x
Armenia* x
Australia x x x
Austria x x
Bangladesh x x
Belgium x x x
Brazil x x x
Bulgaria* x x x x
Canada x x x x
Chile x x x x
China x x x x
Colombia x x
Croatia* x x
Cyprus* x
Czech Republic* x x x
Denmark x x x
Dominican Republic x
Egypt x x
El Salvador x
Estonia* x x x
Finland x x x x
France x x x x
Germany* x x x x
Ghana* x
Greece x
Guatemala* x
Hungary x x x x
Iceland x x x
India x x x x
Indonesia x x
Iran x x
Iraq* x x
Ireland x x x
Israel x
Italy x x x x
Japan x x x x x
Jordan x x
Korea, Republic of x x x x x
Latvia* x x
Lithuania* x x
Luxembourg* x
Malaysia* x
Mali* x
Malta* x x x
Mexico x x x x
Moldavia* x x x
Morocco* x x
Netherlands x x x x
New Zealand x x
Norway x x x x
Pakistan x x
Peru x x x
Philippines x x
Poland x x x x
Portugal x x
Romania* x x x x
Russia* x x x
Saudi Arabia* x
Singapore x
Slovak Republic* x x
Slovenia* x x
South Africa x x x x
Spain x x x x x
Sweden x x x x x
Switzerland x x x
Tanzania x
Thailand* x
Trinidad and Tobago* x
Turkey x x x x
Uganda x
Ukraine* x x
United Kingdom x x x x x
United States x x x x x
Uruguay x x
Venezuela x x
Vietnam* x x
Zambia* x
Zimbabwe x
# of countries 19 36 45 59 49
∗Denotes countries not included in Dearmon and Grier (2009).
Table 2: Variables and sources
Variable Description Source
GDPPC GDP per capita (in logs)a Penn World Tables 6.3
TRUST Share of respondents who trust each other World Values Survey
GWORK Growth of working population World Development Indicators
IGDP Investment (as a share of GDP) Penn World Tables 6.3
HK Share of working population with secondary studies Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (2010)
OPENNESS Degree of openness (as a share of GDP) Penn World Tables 6.3
POLITY Polity 2 (0− 20)b Polity IV Dataset
ETHNIC Ethnic fractionalization (0− 1)c Teorell et al. (2011)
AFRICA 1=African country; 0=otherwise –
tw Temporal dummy for each periodd –
a Base year: $US of 2005.
b Higher values correspond to more democratic institutions.
c Higher values correspond to more fractionalization.
d The w subscript denotes the time period.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean S.d. Min. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max.
GDPPC 208 15,691.83 11,015.73 730.368 6,324.81 12,402.87 24,299.99 64,467.18
TRUST 208 0.305 0.157 0.028 0.188 0.277 0.411 0.742
GWORK 208 0.061 0.011 0.035 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.098
IGDP 208 0.244 0.079 0.044 0.188 0.247 0.298 0.493
HK 208 0.457 0.157 0.045 0.357 0.461 0.564 0.804
OPENNESS 208 0.694 0.446 0.124 0.403 0.586 0.848 3.662
POLITYa 199 16.710 5.080 0.000 16.000 19.000 20.000 20.000
ETHNIC 208 0.316 0.222 0.012 0.118 0.255 0.499 0.930
a Information is missing for Iceland, Iraq, Malta and Luxembourg.
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Table 4: Determinants of GDP per capita: OLS regressions
Dependent variable: GDPPC (in logs)
Covariates Model 1a,c Model 2a,c Model 3b,c Model 4b,c
(Intercept) 8.674∗∗∗ 8.350∗∗∗ 6.789∗∗∗ 7.131∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.439) (0.476) (0.477)
TRUST 2.243∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.300) (0.257) (0.266)
GWORK −13.195∗∗∗ −3.168 −3.928
(4.838) (5.741) (5.770)
IGDP 4.361∗∗∗ 3.726∗∗∗ 3.580∗∗∗
(0.620) (0.746) (0.739)
HK 0.665∗∗ 0.336 0.346
(0.339) (0.350) (0.360)
OPENNESS 0.161 0.160
(0.150) (0.160)
POLITY 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
ETHNIC −0.264 −0.259
(0.259) (0.255)
AFRICA 0.111 0.076
(0.244) (0.251)
Time controls No No No Yes
R2 (Adjusted) 0.164 0.422 0.578 0.590
FSTAT 41.740∗∗∗ 38.830∗∗∗ 32.470∗∗∗ 22.370∗∗∗
χ2 Cook-Weisebergd 0.004 0.106 28.088∗∗∗ 26.152∗∗∗
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
b Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
c ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
d Cook-Weiseberg test for heteroscedasticity. Under the null hypothesis the variance of
the disturbances remains constant.
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Table 5: Determinants of GDP per capita: quantile regression (Model 1)
Dependent variable: GDPPC (in logs)
Quantile (τ)
Covariates τ = 0.05a τ = 0.25a τ = 0.50a τ = 0.75a τ = 0.95a
(Intercept) 7.210
(6.686, 7.705)
8.221
(7.945, 8.391)
8.672
(8.510, 8.844)
9.355
(8.930, 9.611)
10.042
(9.915,10.224)
TRUST 1.801
(−0.000, 3.076)
2.745
(0.601, 3.511)
2.620
(2.223, 2.961)
1.919
(1.325, 3.360)
0.964
(0.610, 1.948)
a According to Figure 3, confidence bands (90%) are in parentheses. They are computed
using the rank method, suitable for samples with fewer than 1,000 observations (see
Koenker, 1994). In bold are those bands not including the zero—i.e. the estimated
coefficient (also in bold) is significant for this quantile.
Table 6: Determinants of GDP per capita: quantile regression (Model 2)
Dependent variable: GDPPC (in logs)
Quantile (τ)
Covariates τ = 0.05a τ = 0.25a τ = 0.50a τ = 0.75a τ = 0.95a
(Intercept) 8.078
(6.811, 9.170)
7.973
(6.845, 9.660)
7.976
(7.530, 8.806)
8.180
(7.580, 9.250)
8.116
(6.540, 9.445)
TRUST 0.046
(−1.762, 2.403)
1.781
(0.934, 2.779)
2.067
(1.565, 2.257)
1.061
(0.880, 1.586)
1.099
(0.195, 2.316)
GWORK −16.154
(−32.632, −3.777)
−16.453
(−32.337, −4.318)
−11.071
(−20.492, −2.351)
−1.919
(−14.993, 7.118)
3.113
(−10.320, 19.206)
IGDP 4.372
(2.720, 4.559)
5.515
(3.272, 6.132)
4.984
(2.863, 6.141)
4.463
(3.380, 4.914)
3.997
(1.802, 8.505)
HK 0.098
(−0.801, 1.396)
0.293
(−0.791, 1.444)
0.597
(0.262, 0.971)
0.787
(0.382, 1.466)
1.259
(0.228, 2.599)
a According to Figure 3, confidence bands (90%) are in parentheses. They are computed using the
rank method, suitable for samples with less than 1,000 observations (see Koenker, 1994). In bold are
those bands not including the zero—i.e the estimated coefficient (also in bold) is significant for this
quantile.
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Table 7: Determinants of GDP per capita: quantile regression (Model 3)
Dependent variable: GDPPC (in logs)
Quantile (τ)
Covariates τ = 0.05a τ = 0.25a τ = 0.50a τ = 0.75a τ = 0.95a
(Intercept) 6.304
(3.844, 7.647)
5.788
(5.332, 6.820)
6.769
(5.327, 7.425)
7.373
(6.985, 7.954)
6.215
(5.733, 9.137)
TRUST 1.976
(−0.287, 3.439)
1.853
(1.284, 2.247)
1.559
(1.244, 1.789)
0.909
(0.686, 1.409)
2.130
(0.498, 3.126)
GWORK −1.695
(−2.785, 2.319)
−0.0780
(−7.774, 6.218)
−2.966
(−13.578, 10.417)
−0.989
(−10.004, 8.265)
20.240
(−7.514, 31.661)
IGDP 4.279
(3.523, 4.928)
3.976
(2.852, 5.310)
3.100
(2.208, 4.133)
3.307
(1.980, 4.211)
3.702
(0.527, 7.534)
HK −0.417
(−1.751, 1.102)
0.272
(−0.123, 0.540)
0.572
(−0.260, 0.682)
0.399
(−0.107, 1.221)
1.528
(0.104, 2.366)
OPENNESS 0.809
(−0.096, 0.964)
0.146
(−0.189, 0.321)
−0.095
(−0.401, 0.314)
0.218
(−0.165, 0.347)
0.157
(−0.061, 0.204)
POLITY 0.093
(0.066, 0.272)
0.098
(0.081, 0.119)
0.083
(0.070, 0.111)
0.063
(0.036, 0.094)
0.031
(−0.039, 0.052)
ETHNIC −1.331
(−2.016, 0.107)
−0.459
(−1.000, 0.328)
−0.083
(−0.582, 0.288)
−0.148
(−0.233, 0.209)
−0.389
(−0.703, 0.438)
AFRICA 0.224
(−1.798, 0.493)
0.587
(−0.980, 0.866)
0.251
(0.011, 0.550)
0.024
(−0.297, 0.419)
−0.440
(−0.791, 1.798)
a According to Figure 3, confidence bands (90%) are in parentheses. They are computed using
the rank method, suitable for samples with less than 1,000 observations (see Koenker, 1994).
In bold are those bands not including the zero—i.e the estimated coefficient (also in bold) is
significant for this quantile.
Table 8: Determinants of per capita GDP: quantile regression (Model 4)
Dependent variable: GDPPC (in logs)
Quantile (τ)
Covariates τ = 0.05a τ = 0.25a τ = 0.50a τ = 0.75a τ = 0.95a
(Intercept) 6.053
(3.115, 9.753)
6.198
(5.585, 7.868)
6.767
(6.058, 7.323)
7.557
(6.815, 8.381)
6.346
(5.675, 10.398)
TRUST 1.955
(−1.496, 3.788)
1.936
(1.058, 2.070)
1.414
(1.149, 1.878)
0.874
(0.637, 1.871)
2.222
(0.369, 3.184)
GWORK − 14.992
(−27.728, 9.020)
− 5.511
(−13.151, 2.210)
0.215
(−10.892, 4.335)
− 2.270
(−11.523, 9.307)
22.045
(−18.227, 29.872)
IGDP 4.064
(2.196, 5.265)
3.998
(2.872, 4.813)
2.806
(2.101, 4.697)
3.371
(1.965, 4.665)
2.972
(−1.005, 7.395)
HK − 0.057
(−1.611, 0.9920)
0.249
(−0.141, 0.824)
0.406
(−0.502, 0.719)
0.352
(−0.697, 1.048)
1.030
(−1.056, 2.812)
OPENNESS 0.931
(−0.316, 0.955)
0.061
(−0.191, 0.419)
− 0.130
(−0.384, 0.338)
0.224
(−0.252, 0.335)
0.149
(−0.155, 0.238)
POLITY 0.095
(0.041, 0.292)
0.095
(0.081, 0.110)
0.087
(0.063, 0.111)
0.056
(0.040, 0.096)
0.031
(−0.054, 0.060)
ETHNIC − 1.186
(−2.182, 1.124)
− 0.119
(−1.021, 0.161)
−0.161
(−0.640, 0.273)
− 0.092
(−0.344, 0.353)
− 0.086
(−0.702, 0.272)
AFRICA 0.477
(−1.798, 0.815)
0.552
(−1.122, 0.813)
0.137
(−0.011, 0.496)
− 0.065
(−0.307, 0.455)
− 0.710
(−1.096,1.798)
a According to Figure 3, confidence bands (90%) are in parentheses. They are computed using the
rank method, suitable for samples with less than 1,000 observations (see Koenker, 1994). In bold
are those bands not including the zero—i.e the estimated coefficient (also in bold) is significant
for this quantile.
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Table 9: ANOVA tests for the equality of
the slope coefficients for different
quantiles (τ)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
F-statistic 5.020 5.387 7.696 6.281
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
The null hypothesis being tested is whether the slope
coefficients for TRUST for the different τ are equal (H0 :
βτ=0.05 = βτ=0.25 = βτ=0.50 = βτ=0.75 = βτ=0.95).
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Figure 1: Income distribution
Notes: Figure shows a Kernel density estimation. We chose a Gaussian kernel, and the bandwidths
were implemented using the plug-in methods of Sheather and Jones (1991).
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Figure 2: Quantile slopes for TRUST
Notes: The plot shows a scatterplot of the data on GDPPC (in logs) vs TRUST. Superimposed on
the plot are the (0.05,0.25,0.75,0.95) quantile regression lines in grey (solid), the median fit (quantile
0.50) in black (solid), and the OLS estimation in black (dashed). The above fits are based on a simple
regression where GDPPC (in logs) is the dependent variable, and TRUST and an intercept, the
regressors.
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Figure 3: Regression quantiles for TRUST
Notes: The slopes for TRUST, estimated by quantile regression for the different models, are plotted
as a function of the different quantiles (percentiles from 1 to 99), represented in the horizontal
axis. The vertical axis represents the values of the estimated coefficients for each quantile, and the
red solid line corresponds to the TRUST coefficient of the OLS estimation. The dashed lines in
red correspond to 90% confidence bands for the OLS estimation, whereas those for the quantile
estimation are represented by the shaded area. In those areas where the confidence bands contain
the zero, the estimated coefficient is non-significant.
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